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ABSTRACT 
There can be hostile relations between nations that are divided politically 
or ideologically, and there are threats in cyberspace as well as physical space. 
Although every cyber threat, like a physical threat, has countermeasures, this can be 
hard because of the complexity of cyberspace and the ethics in cyberspace. 
This study tries to find effective countermeasures for South Korea in cyberspace 
against North Korea’s continuing cyber attacks in light of the Korean peninsula’s 
situation, a typical example of divided nations in the world. To find good solutions, South 
and North Korea’s cyber capabilities are compared in terms of infrastructure, 
organization, defensive capabilities, offensive capabilities, and vulnerabilities. 
Characteristics and features of North Korea’s cyber attacks are inferred by analyses of 
past attacks. Based on these analyses, this study recommends defensive and offensive 
countermeasures to mitigate these cyber threats and prevent escalation. Each 
countermeasure is assessed using considerations such as prevention of escalation, 
efficient use of limited resources, international laws and ethics, and bargaining power in 
the real world. 
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A. BACKGROUND  
Due to advances in computer science and Internet technology, people are enjoying 
the advantages of a high level of information sharing and effective work. In spite of these 
advantages, cyber threats that threaten cyber tools and systems are increasing. There are 
many kinds of cyber threats, including cyber crimes and cyber attacks. Cyber criminals 
are trying to steal personal information and achieve financial gains by spam and phishing. 
Cyber attackers are also influencing international relationships, as in the cyber attacks 
against the Estonian government and financial institutions in 2007, the Russia-Georgia 
cyberwarfare in 2008, and the Stuxnet attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010 
(Chae, 2013). Recently, there was what appeared to be a state-run cyber attack against 
Sony Pictures Entertainment related to the film The Interview that depicted the 
assassination of North Korean leadership (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] National 
Press Office, 2014). 
Cyberwarfare is not limited in physical location and time as conventional warfare 
is, and cyber attacks can be conducted relatively cheaply by anyone because of the 
proliferation of technologies and information (Schelling, 1966). If a state has continuing 
hostile relations with another state, the cyber threat can be increased. In the Korean 
peninsula, the two Koreas divided by ideological issues and a war have this kind of 
hostile relationship. After the armistice agreement of the Korean War in 1953, North 
Korea expressed their strong desire of the unification, and they conducted many 
provocations, such as the Blue House Raid, an unsuccessful attempt by North Korean 
commandos to assassinate the president of South Korea in 1968, and the Republic of 
Korea Ship (ROKS) Cheonan sinking and bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2011. 
Since the 2000s, because of proliferation of the Internet globally and development 
of information technology, North Korean provocations are changing. In the past they 
distributed leaflets and broadcast propaganda to the South as psychological warfare. Now 
they conduct “psychological operations” on the Internet (Hewlett-Packard [HP] Security 
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Research, 2014). Cyber attacks against South Korean websites are also increasing. There 
were more than 70,000 attacks against South Korean government sites from 2008 to 2012 
(Chae, 2013). Among these, significant attacks such as a malware infection on 
government computers in 2004 and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in 2009, 
were attributed to North Korea. North Korea has attacked not only government 
organizations but also private companies (HP Security Research, 2014). 
The North Korean provocations attempt to express their political will and attempt 
to create a favorable environment for negotiation. They follow a plan with these 
provocations. North Korean official media first makes critical statements, then conducts 
cyber attacks, and then possibly conducts armed provocations. In 2008, when the South 
Korean administration changed from President Roh to Lee, North Korea intensified both 
their criticisms and attacks. In 2009, they conducted extensive DDoS attacks on South 
Korea and the United States. After six months, they did a demonstrative tank maneuver 
training using names of places in South Korea in January 2011. In the same month, the 
North Korean National Defense Committee (NDC) announced that they would start a 
retaliatory war against the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance, and they conducted a 
field artillery firing exercise toward the Northern Limit Line (NLL) that is the border in 
the West Sea between South and North Korea. In February 2011, the North Korean State 
Security Department (SSD) stated that they would take a step against South Korea’s 
subversion attempts and seized South Korea’s properties in Mount Kumkang Tourist 
Region. Finally, they carried out a torpedo attack against the ship ROKS Cheonan (Ahn, 
2011). 
If South Korea could plan good responses to North Korean cyber attacks, North 
Korea might stop their provocations before they escalate. Proper defensive and offensive 
countermeasures to cyber provocations can help reduce threats and prevent needless 
damages and sacrifices. However, it is important to find effective responses in cyberspace, 
which has different features than conventional space. 
North Korea appears to be trying to build asymmetric forces instead of 
conventional capabilities because they have financial difficulties (Institute of Unification 
Education [IUE], 2014). Asymmetric capabilities are those addressing not their own 
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weaknesses, such as replacement of old aircraft, but the strengthening of offensive war 
potential toward adversaries’ weaknesses by adding nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, 
special forces, long-range artillery, and submarines. Since South Korea depends more on 
cyberspace, North Korean cyber capabilities are asymmetric. As a result, it is important 
for South Korea and the United States to prepare good responses in cyberspace. 
B. GOAL AND PURPOSE 
Current South Korean responses to cyber attacks have been limited to economic 
and diplomatic sanctions with little beyond that (K. Choi, 2011). The goal of this thesis is 
to find better responses in cyberspace to reduce future cyber attacks. Responses in 
cyberspace include defensive and offensive countermeasures. Defensive countermeasures 
include not only barriers to block and negate the adversary’s attacks, such as powerful 
firewall systems, but also resilience that maintains operability of assets under attacks with 
fast restorations and tolerances. Offensive countermeasures should let the adversary 
recognize that the potential damage on their side would be much bigger than the benefits 
of their future cyber attacks. Delivering this message is important for cyber 
counterattacks because it is very easy to escalate cyberwarfare (Woods, 2015). Ordinary 
democratic states that follow international laws, such as South Korea and the United 
States, cannot conduct indiscriminate cyber attacks like North Korea’s, but they can find 
offensive countermeasure that could be acceptable to the international society. We 
explore that here.  
With more than 80% of the population using the Internet, South Korea has the 
twelfth highest number of Internet users in the world, and the society enjoys a high level 
of information technology (Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning [MSIP] & 
Korea Internet and Security Agency [KISA], 2014). Nevertheless, little planning of the 
proper responses against cyber attacks in cyberspace has been done in South Korea. This 
thesis investigates effective responses in cyberspace to the uncommon condition of a 
nation divided by ideological differences. 
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C. OUTLINE 
This thesis has five chapters. Chapter II discusses general definitions related to 
cyberwarfare and techniques. Chapter III studies the cyber capabilities of the two divided 
nations in the Korean peninsula that is the background of this thesis. For each the chapter 
summarizes cyber infrastructures, organizations, defensive and offensive capabilities, and 
vulnerability analyses. In addition, Chapter III analyzes past cyber attacks that were 
attributed to North Korea against South Korea. Chapter IV recommends effective 
responses for South Korea with considerations, limitations, and scenario analyses. Finally, 
the thesis concludes with a summary and future works in Chapter V. 
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II. CONCEPTS OF CYBERWARFARE 
A. CYBERSPACE, CYBERWARFARE, AND CYBER COERCION 
According to Joint Publication 3–12(R) of U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
Division of Cyberspace Operations, cyberspace is one of the five warfare domains, the 
others being air, land, marine, and space (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). Cyberspace 
consists of computers and digital devices. Similar to air operations that depend on bases, 
cyber operations depend on infrastructures of physical domains. In addition, cyberspace 
consists of multiple overlapped networks which connect globally. 
Activities in cyberspace can have big effects with relatively cheap costs due to 
proliferation and standardization of technologies (H. Yoon, 2012). Furthermore, because 
cyberspace is a virtual space that is not limited by physical locations and time zones, 
there are no front lines or boundaries: Any area could be vulnerable to cyber attacks and 
targeted without any physical limitation. However, cyberwarfare, like nuclear or 
conventional warfare, can be conducted with layered defenses or offenses (Flemming, 
2014), so it is possible to coerce adversaries by cyber actions during the escalation of 
hostile levels. 
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REAL-WORLD NEGOTIATIONS AND 
CYBER ACTIVITIES 
Cyber responses can prompt an agreement to cease a cyber conflict between two 
states. Compensation for losses can then be discussed at the bargaining table. For these 
reasons, we should consider the effects of cyber activities on real-world negotiations. 
Pillar suggests how to use military capabilities for negotiations (Pillar, 1983). 
Many of these considerations can be applied to cyberspace. First, we should use 
cyberspace operations to change our bargaining stance if we can. Second, we should 
convince the enemy that they would incur more costs without peace agreements. For 
cyberwarfare, we should prepare defensive responses to minimize damage to us from the 
adversary’s cyber attacks and show that our offensive capabilities that could incur high 
damages for the adversary. Third, we should use a level of force that suggests that there 
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are further counterattacks available to an adversary’s continued hostile acts. Finally, 
during negotiation, we should refrain from further escalation to show the adversary the 
advantages of stopping their attacks. Another consideration is that, as in past negotiations 
between South and North Korea (Ko, 2009), the amount of information and intelligence 
available about the attacks has important effects on the bargaining table. If a country 
prepares enough information related to its adversary’s cyber capabilities, it could gain an 
advantage. 
C. TECHNIQUES OF CYBERWARFARE 
Just as there are many kinds of weapon systems and techniques in traditional 
warfare, there are also many kinds of attack techniques in cyberspace. 
Cyber security consists of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C-I-A). 
Confidentiality means the ability of a system to ensure that an asset is viewed only by 
authorized parties. Integrity is the ability of a system to ensure that an asset is modified 
only by authorized people. Availability is the ability of a system to ensure that an asset 
can be used by any authorized parties (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2012). Cyberwarfare can be 
considered activities that attack at least one component of the C-I-A triad. For example, a 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack creates excessive traffic to exhaust a target 
system’s resources, such as computing power or memory. During this attack, the target 
system cannot provide normal service, which hurts availability (Patrikakis, Masikos, & 
Zouraraki, 2004). 
1. Types of Frequent Attacks on South Korea 
According to analysis by the Korea Internet and Security Agency (KISA), the 
most frequent cyber attacks reported in South Korea are spreading malicious code from 
Web pages, defacement of Web pages, DDoS, and phishing (Yoo & Yoo, 2014). 
Spreading malicious code from Web pages is an attempt to infect users of the 
target server. The attacker uses various methods to penetrate the server and implant 
malicious code, including Remote File Inclusion (RFI) and Structured Query Language 
(SQL) injection. Regular inspections of vulnerabilities and timely applications of update 
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patches are important to mitigate this kind of attack. Note that malicious code can exist in 
links or advertisements instead of content created by the Web page owners or 
administrators. 
Defacement of Web pages changes the content of Web pages for propaganda 
purposes. Such attacks indicate the intentions of attackers and show off an attacker’s 
capabilities in addition to delivering the propaganda. 
A DDoS attack usually generates many packets and much traffic by using botnets. 
When a service is under DDoS attack, unusual patterns of repeated traffic are often seen. 
Therefore, analysis of current abnormal packets provides a good start for mitigation. 
Phishing is the use of fake sites to steal personal information by enticing users 
through the impersonation of others, such as patronized businesses, acquaintances, or 
celebrities. This kind of attack is often used for bank fraud by criminals. 
2. Types of Attacks Categorized by Certified Ethical Hackers 
A Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) is a computer-security expert who uses hacking 
technologies for legitimate purposes. According to the CEH’s criteria, a cyber attack on a 
system can be an Operating System (OS) attack, a misconfiguration attack, an 
application-level attack, or a shrink-wrap-code attack (EC-Council, 2013). All these 
methods try to exploit vulnerabilities of systems to gain unauthorized access. Then 
attackers can exploit specific protocol implementations, attack the built-in authorization 
system, break the security of the file system, or crack passwords and the encryption 
mechanism. 
For an OS attack, attackers find vulnerabilities in design, installation, and settings 
of an OS and exploit these vulnerabilities to gain access. A misconfiguration attack 
attacks a misconfigured system. These misconfigurations can cause illegal accesses to 
Web servers, application platforms, databases, and networks. System administrators 
should check configurations and remove unnecessary service and software to reduce 
these threats. 
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An application-level attack involves the attacker gaining unauthorized access by 
exploiting vulnerabilities of running applications and manipulating or stealing data. If 
applications do not check for errors sufficiently, application-level attacks such as buffer-
overflow attacks, cross-site scripting, session hijacking, man-in-the-middle attacks, DoS 
attacks, and SQL injection attacks are possible. Lastly, a shrink-wrap code attack exploits 
vulnerabilities of off-the-shelf library and codes. 
3. Types of Network Attacks 
Today, most computer devices are connected to the Internet or other networks, 
and cyber attacks are often conducted through networks. Network-based cyber attacks 
can be categorized as DoS attacks, DDoS attacks, sniffing attacks, spoofing attacks, and 
session-hijacking attacks (Eom, Jung, Han, & Park, 2009). 
DoS and DDoS attacks were mentioned previously; both are attacks against 
availability. Sniffing attacks get information by collecting traffic in transmission. They 
can be divided into media access control (MAC) flooding, domain-name service (DNS) 
flooding, address-resolution protocol (ARP) poisoning, dynamic host configuration 
protocol (DHCP) attacks, password sniffing, and others (EC-Council, 2013) 
Spoofing attacks impersonate unique identifiers used in transmitting data, such as 
Internet Protocol (IP) or MAC addresses. Spoofing can be helpful in concealing the 
country of origin of an attack. Session hijacking means that the attackers interpose 
themselves between two communicating hosts and take control of their sessions. 
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III. CYBER CAPABILITIES IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
In the Korean Peninsula, two divided countries since the Korean War confront 
each other militarily. South and North Korea are continuing in a conflict state, and, 
according to the statistics, North Korea violated the armistice agreement 221 times and 
carried out 26 military attacks from 1953 to 2011 (Shin, 2011). 
North Korea builds up asymmetric war capabilities instead of conventional forces 
to overcome an inferiority of military power. They are ignoring international opinion and 
focusing on weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons, missiles, chemical 
weapons, and biological weapons. Furthermore, with the lessons from the Gulf War and 
Iraq War, they have also been increasing their special forces as an asymmetric power 
since the 1990s. Recently, there are many indications that North Korea is preparing the 
“fourth generation warfare” by establishing cyberwarfare units and developing cyber-
provocation capabilities against South Korea (Institute of Unification Education [IUE], 
2014). More than 70,000 cyber attacks have been conducted against South Korean 
government Websites, and many significant attacks, including the large-scale DDoS 
attack in 2009, have been attributed to North Korea (Chae, 2013). 
In this situation, it is helpful to survey infrastructures, organizations, defensive 
capabilities, offensive capabilities, and vulnerabilities in detail. Research on 
infrastructure and organizations can show each country’s overall capabilities, and 
vulnerabilities can be analyzed by defensive and offensive capabilities. Vulnerabilities of 
the adversary can be considered for targeting procedures and finding proper responses, 
and our vulnerabilities can influence our defensive postures. 
A. NORTH KOREA 
As North Korea is one of the most closed countries in the world, information 
about it is relatively scarce. In addition, because their citizens and media are strongly 
controlled by the North Korean government, it is very hard to find the precise facts of 
their situation. Although many of people outside of North Korea use personal devices 
such as personal computers and smart phones, North Koreans are strictly limited in 
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obtaining those devices and connecting to the Internet. This also makes it harder to get 
information about the North Korean people. Moreover, it is not easy to estimate current 
conditions. Although information from ROK and U.S. government agencies are more 
reliable, most of them do not provide detailed information because of security concerns. 
We summarize here what we do know about North Korean cyber infrastructure, 
organizations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities based on recent research. 
1. Infrastructure 
Most analysis of North Korea’s cyberwarfare focuses on North Korea’s cyber 
strategy and policy proposals, although there are a few analyses of infrastructure in detail. 
The Cyber Defense Research Center at Korea University conducted a study to analyze 
North Korea’s cyber capabilities from the viewpoints of infrastructure, investments, 
systems, education and training, research and development, doctrine, strategy, and tactics 
(Lim, Kwan, Chang, & Baek, 2013). According to this study, the most distinctive feature 
of North Korea’s cyber infrastructure is the separation of the local networks from 
networks for the Internet. North Korea regards the Internet as a very useful tool, but it 
also can be a great threat to the North Korean government. In 1996, North Korea 
constructed the domestic intranets “Kwangmyong (bright)” for citizens, “Bulguengom 
(red sword)” for the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), “Bangpae (shield)” for the 
Ministry of State Security (MSS), and “Kuembyol (gold star)” for the military. The 
unclassified intranet “Kwangmyong” connects 3,700 organizations and its estimated 
users are 50,000. To connect to the Internet, optical-fiber cables link from Dandong, 
China, to Sinuiju, North Korea, and they use Chinese IP addresses. Use of the Internet in 
North Korea is strictly controlled by the North Korean government, and users are 
estimated to be only hundreds of high-ranked officials. Furthermore, because they have 
an electrical power shortage, operating hours are limited. 
A U.S. research institute, the Korea Economic Institute of America, noted that 
North Korea’s cyberspace is evolving now although it is limited (Mansourov, 2014). For 
example, it was significant progress when they opened six official Websites to the public. 
North Korea has installed millions of devices that were imported from China over the 
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past few years, and local networks are steadily expanding. Their networks are based on 
Linux, and the “Kwangmyong” intranet is operated through 2.5GB backbone optical-
fiber cables. There is reported to be a PC café in which people can use email services and 
do Web surfing in their intranet. Cellular networks are provided by Koryo Link, a joint 
venture between the Egyptian company Orascom and the North Korean Ministry of Posts 
and Telecommunications. The cellular network provides 3G-network cellphone service, 
and the number of users is estimated at 2.5 million, 10% of the population. General users 
cannot access the Internet now; however, according to the executive chairman of Google, 
it is easy to connect to the Internet from the North Korean cellular network (Mansourov, 
2014). Some high-ranking officials use a North Korean smartphone “Arirang” which 
connects to their intranet Websites. North Korea has one additional security layer on the 
Internet because they connect to the Internet via China.  
HP Security Research made a more detailed analysis of North Korea’s cyber 
infrastructure (HP Security Research, 2014) that confirmed that there are two separate 
networks. The OS in North Korean networks is “Bulguenbyol (red star)” that was 
developed based on Linux in 2002. It includes software packages developed by North 
Korea, including “Naenara (my country),” a Web browser based on Firefox. No 
limitations and controls are imposed to use this OS, but purchases of computer devices 
are strictly controlled by the North Korean government. The North Korean government 
can monitor the usage of devices and networks easily with this OS.  
North Korea’s owned IP block is 175.45.176.0/22, and the North Korean Ministry 
of Posts and Telecommunications is registered as 210.52.109.0/24 in China Unicom. The 
autonomous system (AS) number of North Korea is AS1312179, and its only peer is 
China Unicom AS4837. The country code Top-Level Domain is .kp, and they have three 
name servers, ns1.kptc.kp, ns2.kptc.kp, and ns3.kptc.kp. As for related equipment 
production, North Korea does some hardware and software development because of the 
required technologies. However, they have difficulties doing so because of their lack of 
modern production facilities and reliable electricity. They appear to develop their own 
software, but hardware is dependent on China because of international sanctions and the 
problem of production infrastructure. Despite this limited infrastructure, their footprints 
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in cyberspace are being identified more frequently. Table 1 summarizes North Korea’s 
cyber infrastructure. 
Table 1.   Summary of Infrastructure 
 Characteristics  
Internet Strictly restricted. Connected via China. 
Intranet Separated from the Internet. Domestic use only. 
OS Self-developed OS “Bulguenbyol (red star)” based on Linux. Easy to monitor users. 
Software Developed in North Korea. Based on Linux. 
Hardware Limited production. Depends on imports from China. 
Cellular 3G network without Internet access. Smart phones can access the intranet. 
 
2. Organizations 
Despite their limitations in software and hardware, North Korea has tried to 
expand offensive cyberwarfare organizations since the 1980s. The National Defense 
Commission (NDC) has established several cyberwarfare organizations under the 
Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) and the General Staff Department (GSD; Cho, 
2013). The RGB manages Unit 121, which is in charge of hacking, cyberwarfare, cyber 
espionage, and virus dissemination. Other organizations under RGB are the No. 91 Office 
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(a hacker unit), the No. 31 and No. 32 Offices (cyber psychological-operations units), the 
Investigation Office (a hacking organization targeting political, economic, and social 
organizations), the Technical Reconnaissance Team (a hacking organization targeting 
military and strategy organizations), and Lab 110. GSD, which commands military forces, 
has two cyberwarfare organizations. One is the Command Automation Bureau, which 
controls the No. 21 Office that develops hacking programs, the No. 32 Office that 
develops military software, and the No. 56 Office that develops command and control 
software. Another is the Enemy Attack Bureau, which commands the No. 204 Office that 
is in charge of cyber psychological operations against South Korean military. 
There are additional cyberwarfare organizations besides those (Lim et al., 2013). 
The Unified Front Department (UFD) in the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) controls an 
Operations Department that conducts psychological operations aimed at the South 
Korean people with conventional and cyber means, and the No. 225 Office in the UFD 
has charge of development and installation of cyber hiding places, issuance of spy 
directives, and communication by cyberspace. Cyberwarfare units are also in the front 
corps (K. Yoon, 2011). Each has a battalion-size cyberwarfare unit in charge of cyber 
defense. Unit 121 conducts operations and trainings in China or other countries where it 
is easier to access the Internet than in North Korea. The Command Automation Bureau in 
the GSD controls two brigade-level units, and each unit consists of approximately 600 
people. There is an independent cyber command in the Korean People’s Army, though it 
is not on the same level as the Air Force, Navy, Army, or Strategic Rocket Commands 
(Mansourov, 2014). 
  The three larger organizations in North Korea concerned with cyberspace are the 
NDC, the WPK, and the Cabinet (HP Security Research, 2014). The NDC is the most 
powerful organization in North Korea, and the first chairman is Kim Jung-un, who is the 
dictator of North Korea. The NDC is made up of the MSS, the MPS, the Ministry of 
People’s Armed Forces (MPAF), and the KPA. As an intelligence agency, the MSS is in 
charge of counterintelligence and has a subordinate unit for communications monitoring 
and hacking. The MPS is in charge of the domestic public peace, so it is not related to 
cyberwarfare. The MPAF supervises the KPA and the GSD, and the GSD controls the 
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military operations of the KPA and supervises the RGB. The RGB is in charge of secret 
operations and conducts those operations with both conventional and cyber means; it 
controls the No. 91 Office, Unit 121, and Lab 110 as cyber-warfare organizations. The 
No. 91 Office conducts hacking operations from North Korea, Unit 121 carries out 
hacking missions from foreign countries such as China, and Lab 110 maintains technical 
teams. 
Another large organization, the WPK, is the dominating political group in North 
Korea. It consists of the Central Party Committee (CPC), the UFD, the Unification 
Bureau, the Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau, the Liaison Department, and others. 
The CPC supervises the Central Party Investigative Group, known as Unit 35, and Unit 
35 is in charge of the training and education of cyber warriors. The Operations 
Department of the Unification Bureau manages cyber psychological operations and 
espionage and supervises Unit 204 and the No. 225 Office. Unit 204 is in charge of the 
planning of cyber psychological operations, and the No. 225 Office manages 
conventional spy activities instead of cyber espionage. The UDF takes charge of 
conventional propaganda to South Korea. The Liaison Department does not have any 
cyber-related subordinate organizations. However, it supervises Chongryon, a pro-North 
Korean organization in Japan, and acquires resources and information through 
Chongryon. 
Finally, the Cabinet is an administrative organization in charge of domestic affairs. 
It controls the Central Science and Technology Information Agency (CSTIA), the 
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
(MPT), and others. The CSTIA is the biggest technology facility in North Korea, and it is 
in charge of collection and analysis of advanced technologies. The MPT supervises 
communication industries in North Korea. Figure 1 gives the North Korean cyber and 
intelligence organizational chart from HP Security Research. 
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Figure 1.  North Korean Cyber and Intelligence Organizational Chart 
Source: (HP Security Research, 2014). Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North 
Korea’s cyber threat landscape (HP Security Briefing Episode 16). Retrieved from 
http://community.hpe.com/hpeb/attachments/hpeb/off-by-on-software-security-blog/388/
2/HPSR%20SecurityBriefing_Episode16_NorthKorea.pdf 
North Korea’s cyberwarfare is conducted by the NDC’s and the WPK’s 
subordinate organizations. The Cabinet is far from cyberwarfare. As each study was 
researched at different times and there are several translational mistakes in studies from 
the United States, there is some lack of clarity about cyber capabilities. For this reason, it 
will be helpful to refer to the official organization analysis of North Korean leadership by 
the South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU; MOU, 2014).  
The cyberwarfare organizations in the NDC are considered to be under the control 
of the GSD. The GSD is described as the subordinate organization of the MPAF, but the 
MOU claims that the GSD commands military forces at large and oversees military 
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operations and training, and the MPAF carries out all activities and affairs related to 
munitions, equipment, construction, military diplomacy, and civil defense, which means 
they are equal-level organizations (MOU, 2014). There is no cyberwarfare organization 
under the MPAF. According to the MOU’s studies of North Korea’s cyber organizations, 
the RGB is the most important organization, and it is subordinate to the GSD. Many 
studies said there are a Unit 121, a No. 91 Office, a No. 31 Office, a No. 32 Office, a Lab 
110, and others. As cyber footprints, including their cyber attacks, are increasing, these 
subordinate organizations and their functions are expanding. Although the Command 
Automation Bureau and Enemy Attack Bureau in the GSD take charge of cyber-related 
missions, the RGB and its subordinates are more responsible for cyberwarfare. Since the 
MSS tracks down and handles spies and dissidents within the KPA and prevents 
espionage, it focuses on domestic cyber monitoring more than overseeing cyber attacks. 
In the WPK’s case, the UFD can be considered the most relevant organization to 
cyberwarfare. Although HP Security Research described it as concentrating on 
conventional means and the Unification Bureau as more responsible for cyber operations, 
no organization named the Unification Bureau exists in official documents of North 
Korean organizations. But apparently there is an Operations Department under a 
Unification Bureau, and the Operations Department is subordinate to the UFD, which 
could be a translational mistake. It is reasonable to think that the cyberwarfare 
organization in the WPK is the Operations Department of the WFD. In addition, the 
Central Party Investigative Group that is in charge of cyber-warrior training and 
education in the WPK also does not exist in the official analysis, and this can be a 
translational error of the Central Inspection Committee (CIC; WPK, 2010). According to 
the WPK Charter, the CIC is a monitoring agency in charge of the eradication of 
dissidents in the WPK. 
As a result, North Korea’s cyberwarfare organizations can be best described in 
Figure 2. This chart is based on the analysis discussed previously. 
 17 
Figure 2.  North Korean Cyber and Intelligence Organizational Chart  
 
 
3. Defensive Capabilities 
Lim and other researchers of Korea University analyzed North Korea’s defensive 
capabilities based on past cyber attacks against North Korea (Lim et al., 2013). All 
attacks against North Korea were attacks against their external Websites, which are for 
propaganda, and not against intranets such as Kwangmyeong. Propaganda Websites such 
as www.Uriminzokkiri.com have been attacked by users of www.dcinside.com, a South 
Korean community portal site, in 2011 and by Anonymous in 2013, but the damage was 
temporary denial of services or defacement (H. Jung, 2011). North Korea’s outside sites 
are easy to attack because there are not many users and the servers are relatively small. 
Outside propaganda sites contain only public content, which means a high level of 
 18 
defense is not required; (Lim et al., 2013) assumed North Korean intranets are well-
defended by network separation and isolation. 
Another study analyzed North Korea’s self-developed OS, Red Star, as an 
important feature of their cyber defense (Cho, 2013). Most North Korean computers are 
using Red Star, and it is not very vulnerable to attack because it is not a common OS in 
the world compared to Microsoft Windows. However, since this OS is based on open-
source Linux software, it is still vulnerable to Linux attacks such as DDoS, backdoors, 
and packet inspection (M. Lee, 2011). Leakage of information is not very useful from 
these sites anyway because the North Korean government has separated their military and 
other important intranet from it (Mansourov, 2014). 
4. Offensive Capabilities 
North Korea is one of the countries, along with China and Russia, that is using 
cyberspace most aggressively (Hong, 2011). The Agency for Defense Development in 
South Korea pointed out that the level of North Korean hackers compares with that of the 
CIA (Jung, S., 2013). However, there are different assessments (Singer & Freidman, 
2014). One interview claims that North Korea’s cyber attacks against South Korea are not 
significant and are exaggerated (Danchev, 2012). Another assessment claims that North 
Korea’s cyber capabilities are ranked second after Russia, with offensive capabilities 
ranked as sixth and cyber intelligence ranked as seventh (Coleman, 2010) as shown in 
Table 2. 
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U.S. 4.2 3.8 4.0 4.0 
China 4.2 3.8 4.0 4.0 
Russia 4.3 3.5 3.8 3.9 
India 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.7 
Iran 4.1 3.4 3.4 3.6 
North Korea 4.2 3.4 3.3 3.6 
Japan 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.6 
Israel 4.0 3.8 3.0 3.6 
South Korea 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.2 
Pakistan 3.9 2.7 2.6 3.1 
Source: Coleman, K. (2010). The weaponry and strategies of digital conflict. Proceedings 
of the 5th International Conference on Information Warfare and Security (p. 498). 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology. 
North Korea’s offensive cyber operations (OCO) and computer network 
operations (CNO) capabilities became apparent as early as 2004 when North Korea 
gained access to 33 of 80 wireless communication networks of the Republic of Korea 
military (HP Security Research, 2014). North Korea is reported to be developing hacking 
technologies to paralyze the alliance’s network, extort military secrets, and spread 
computer viruses (Mansourov, 2014). North Korea uses cyberwarfare training simulation 
software and gathers intelligence widely by using phishing and spyware to target high-
ranking officials. Also, the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) has 
estimated that North Korea has developed offensive cyber capabilities to take over 
power-supply systems in South Korea (Kshetri, 2014). 
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5. Vulnerabilities 
The North Korean infrastructure does not have enough electricity for cyber 
operations, and the attacks directly from North Korea are easy to attribute because they 
have few IP addresses (Lim et al., 2013). So North Korea overcomes these limitations by 
going through China, and usually organized attacks are launched from outside of North 
Korea. However, many media reports indicate that the relationship between China and 
North Korea has cooled (Oh, 2015), and China opposed North Korea’s nuclear program 
indirectly (Chae, 2015). 
North Korea does have certain disadvantages in cyberspace that can be exploited. 
Since there are no voluntary hacker groups in North Korea because the North Korean 
government strongly controls all networks, all cyber attacks from North Korea can be 
attributed to the North Korean government (HP Security Research, 2014). Because of 
economic sanctions due to their nuclear program and lack of production infrastructure, 
North Korea has difficulty in acquiring technologies and devices for developing their 
cyber capabilities. In addition, devices from China can be imported with vulnerabilities, 
which means that North Korean networks cannot be completely secured even though 
their intranets are air-gapped. 
B. SOUTH KOREA 
According to statistics from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
South Korea has the 12th highest number of Internet users in the world, which means that 
the country has a high dependency on the Internet as well as high Internet availability 
(MSIP & KISA, 2014). This is shown in Figure 3. According to the MSIP, 98% of 
businesses in South Korea with more than 10 employees are connected to the Internet, 
and 86.7% of employees are using the Internet for business. In addition, most citizens 
have smart phones. This wide connectivity has many risks such as cyber crimes and 
cyber attacks.  
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Figure 3.  Internet Usage  by Country 
 
Source: (MSIP & KISA, 2014). Korea Internet white paper 2014 (GPRN 11-B551505-
000008-10). Seoul, Republic of Korea: Myeong-jin C&P, p. 497. 
1. Infrastructure 
South Korea is connected to the Internet via nine international undersea fiber-
optic cables in eight areas, and the cables provide a 27 Tbps connection (MSIP & KISA, 
2014). The country operates three communication satellites that aid Internet connections. 
Individual users can access the Internet via not only a wired connection up to 1 Gbps, but 
also by 4G LTE connections with smart phones. In 2014, South Korea had approximately 
122 million IPv4 addresses, which is the 6th highest rank in the world, and had 1,018 
Autonomous System (AS) numbers as the 13th rank. In contrast to that, North Korea has 
only a few IP blocks and one AS number. South Korea’s Country Code Top Level 
Domain (ccTLD) is .kr, and more than 110 million domains are registered. The national 
Domain Name Service (DNS) consists of 15 sites, and the average daily query total of it 
is about 1.6 billion.  
South Korea keeps many external networks, and Internet services are provided by 
a number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) instead of by the government. Though 
North Korea operates only one OS, South Korea uses a variety of OSes, including 
Windows, OS X, and Linux. However, as most government organizations provide 
Windows-friendly Web pages and applications, the majority of people are using 
Windows. In the case of software, South Korea uses many applications from various 
companies, such as Microsoft Office or Adobe Photoshop. However, many South 
Koreans prefer to use domestic word processors and domestic anti-virus software. 
Furthermore, due the policy of favoring domestic software manufactures, government 
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organizations tend to use domestic products. In the case of hardware, many domestic and 
imported products are being used together, and most foreign devices are imported for 
technical or price competitiveness. In contrast with North Korea, there are no limitations 
on imports or production. 
Although South Korea also manages intranets, these intranets are operated in a 
limited way for special purposes by major organizations and military units, and there are 
no intranets like North Korea’s intranet. 
2. Organizations 
In contrast with South Korea’s advanced Internet environment, organizations for 
cyberwarfare and cyber security were created relatively late in South Korea. A triggering 
event for South Korean cyber organization was the extensive DDoS attack from North 
Korea in 2009 (K. Choi, 2011). Before the attack, the only cyber-related organizations in 
the military were Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) for each military 
branch and the Defense Security Command (DSC) and the National Defense Information 
Warfare Response Center, both of which were focused on defensive operations. After the 
attack in 2009, a number of weaknesses of the current cyber organizations were identified, 
and in 2011, South Korea formed a Cyber Command that is in charge of cyberwarfare. 
The National Defense Cyber C2 Center in Cyber Command shares information 
with National Risk Management Center in the executive office of the president of the 
Republic of Korea (the Blue House) and collects reports from subordinate CERTs (K. 
Choi, 2012). The establishment of the Korea Computer Emergency Team Coordination 
Center (KrCERT/CC) in KISA, the National Cyber Security Center in NIS, and the 
Information Warfare Response Center in MND in 2003 were the first steps towards South 
Korean cyber organizations (H. Yoon, 2012). The South Korea National Police Agency 
has formed offices of cyber investigation nationally, and they are in charge of personal 
information leakage, online illegal pornography, gambling sites, Internet frauds, cyber 
smears, and digital copyright infringement. Yoon argued that attacks in cyberspace are 
harder to classify than in the real world because the targets are varied, such as states, the 
private sectors, and military units, and each cyber organization responds differently to 
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each category of event, such as cyberwarfare or cyber crime, and this procedure makes 
coordinated responses difficult. The Blue House, which is the highest national 
organization in South Korea, acts as an overall manager of cyber security, and the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) manages working-level businesses, including 
coordination of joint-response actions between the private, government, and military 
sectors (NIS, 2015). These organizations are shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  South Korea National Cyber Security Organizational Chart  
Source: National Intelligence Service (NIS), 2015. National Information Security White 
Paper 2015. Retrieved from http://isis.kisa.or.kr/ebook/ebook2.html  
The Office of National Security in the Blue House does situation reports on cyber 
crisis and directs responding acts when under attack, and the Head of Future Strategy 
establishes laws, systems, and policies as a control tower in peace times. The NIS 
manages the National Cyber Security Center, which has responsibility for the prevention 
of national and public cyber attacks, cyber investigations, and cyber-threat analyses. The 
National Cyber Security Center in the NIS operates the Joint Response Team, which 
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combines forces with various agencies in different fields. The Ministry of National 
Defense (MND) has the DSC and the Cyber Command for cyber operations, and is in 
charge of prevention of and response to cyber threats, including defense, fulfillment of 
cyber operations, and development of technologies related to cyberwarfare. The MSIP 
has responsibility for cyber security in the private sector, including monitoring abnormal 
symptoms in domestic cyberspace and malware interdiction. For cyber security in the 
public sector, each central agency operates segmental security monitoring and control 
centers. The Korea Communications Commission and Personal Information Protection 
Commission formulate policies for personal-information protection in cyberspace, the 
Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs manages information security 
of electronic government, and the Financial Services Commission sets policies for 
electronic-banking security. 
There are several specialized institutions and agencies for cyber security in South 
Korea, such as the Korea Internet and Society Agency (KISA), the National Security 
Research Institute (NSR), the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute 
(ETRI), and the Financial Security Institute. KISA has several subordinate organizations. 
The Korea Internet Security Center (KISC) is in charge of computer-security incident-
information sharing. The KISA Academy is an educational facility to train experts. The 
Knowledge Information Security Industry Support Center (KISIS) supports the 
development of cyber-security technologies. In addition, there are subordinates such as 
the Korea National Biometric Test Center (K-NBTC), the Illegal Spam Response Center, 
and the Phishing Response Center. The NSR manages the Security Monitoring and 
Control Technical Support Center for domestic-research-institute networks, the Cyber 
Security Training and Exercise Center (CSTEC), and the Information Technology 
Security Certification Center (ITSCC). The ITSCC is responsible for security 
certification based on the criteria of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement 
(CCRA). The ETRI is the research facility for core technologies in the private sector, and 
it manages the Cyber Security Research Center, which is in charge of research on cyber-
security technologies, including digital cryptography and cyber-security system 
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technologies such as network-security technologies and mobile-security solutions. The 
Financial Security Institute focuses on security technologies related to electronic finance. 
In addition, in South Korea there are several private organizations such as the 
National Information Security Agency (NISA), the Korea Institute of Information 
Security and Cryptology (KIISC), the Korea Convergence Security Association (KCSA), 
and the Korea Online Privacy Association (KOPA). Among these organizations, the 
National Cyber Security Center under the NIS can be considered the most important for 
cyber security. In addition, since cyberwarfare is a domain for military operations, the 
Cyber Command in the MND can conduct cyberwarfare as well as the NIS. The DSC is 
in charge of defensive tasks in cyberspace because the command focuses more on 
counter-espionage and conventional security than cyberwarfare. 
The CERT Building and Operations Book published by KISA and the Consortium 
of CERT (CONCERT) provides the guidelines for public and private organizations to 
establish CERTs, and it suggests how CERTs for small units and organizations in South 
Korea can be structured (KISA and CONCERT, 2010). According to the book, each 
CERT should consist of a committee, squads, and a working-level consultative group. 
The committee makes decisions, and squads are working groups that conduct information 
protection and vulnerability checks in the enterprise. 
3. Defensive Capabilities 
According to the National Information Security White Paper (NIS, 2015), South 
Korea’s information security is divided into public information security, infrastructure 
information security, and private information security. 
Public information security is divided broadly into national-information 
communications network security and electronic-government security. The national-
information communications network security is achieved by an information-security-
management state inspection by the NIS, which assesses the security level of each 
organization in regard to operations of CERTs, verification processes of security 
suitability and cryptographic modules, and so on. Electronic-government security is 
conducted by central and local e-government cyber-response centers under the Ministry 
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of Government Administration and Home Affairs, and includes a software-development 
security system to minimize vulnerabilities of public software. In addition, because the 
administrative environment is changing from paper to electronic documents, they 
developed electronic signature authorization systems to enhance security. 
Infrastructure information security is related to protection of communications 
infrastructure including electronic control and management networks for national security, 
administrative, defense, police, finance, communication, transportation, and energy. The 
NIS and MSIP carry out security inspections for protection of this infrastructure, and the 
KISA, NSR, and other institutes support technical issues. Private information security is 
divided into response and prevention of computer emergencies. For computer 
emergencies, the MSIP and KISA operate the Computer Emergency Response Center, 
which is responsible for carrying out the detection of malware, implementing responses 
against DDoS attacks by establishing cyber shelters and zombie PC treatment systems, 
and implementing responses against wire frauds. To minimize emergencies, the KrCERT/
CC cooperates with the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the 
Asia-Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT), and other international 
organizations, and runs cyber-security professional groups that consist of security experts. 
The White Paper and related works do not report defensive capabilities of the 
defense and intelligence areas because most of this information is classified. Although 
some military networks and other essential networks are connected to the Internet, they 
also operate air-gapped intranets with security measures such as cryptographic modules 
that correspond to security levels. The MND does maintain the public Information 
Operation Condition (INFOCON) to respond appropriately (Kshetri, 2014). 
South Korea could expand their defensive capabilities because they have many 
more cyber resources than North Korea (Kshetri, 2014). South Korean anti-virus software 
manufacturers such as AhnLab and HAURI should have enough capabilities to detect and 
halt cyber attacks given adequate resources. 
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4. Offensive Capabilities 
The cyber-attack capabilities of South Korea are classified. According to recent 
media reports, the South Korean intelligence agency NIS is exploring hacking software 
(Kang, 2015). The BBC reported that the South Korea Cyber Command is developing 
Stuxnet-like cyber weapons (BBC, 2014). According to the report, the offensive 
capabilities of Cyber Command have increased since 2010. Previously it focused on 
cyber psychological operations, but is now shifting attention to preparing cyberwarfare. 
The MND announced the Cyber Command Development Plan, which contains 
development of Stuxnet-like cyber weapons and enhancement of comprehensive 
cyberwarfare capabilities (Shin, 2014). Another report said that the Stuxnet-like cyber 
weapon might attack the adversary’s cyber attack source itself (K. Kim, 2014). 
South Korea could develop offensive capabilities more than North Korea because 
of their much greater cyber resources (Kshetri, 2014). Then it does seem foolish for 
North Korea to cyber-attack South Korea, and this point should be made clear in 
negotiations. Furthermore, South Korea and the United States have agreed that they will 
develop cyber weapons together (E. Kim, 2013), which means South Korea’s cyber 
offensive capabilities can be expanded as necessary with U.S. capabilities. 
Other kinds of offensive cyber activities can be considered. One of North Korea’s 
external propaganda Websites, uriminzokkiri.com, was hacked by users of dcinside.com, 
one of the online community services in South Korea, in 2011 (H. Jung, 2011). Although 
the past attack from Anonymous against North Korea was hard to attribute to any country, 
the attack in 2011 was obviously from South Korea. South Korea is, however, limited in 
how it can control and use these voluntary hackers because it follows international laws. 
Based on all of this, as well as South Korea’s cooperative relationship with the United 
States, South Korea’s offensive capabilities should be at least equal to those of North 
Korea. 
5. Vulnerabilities 
South Korea’s vast cyber resources and dependency on digital culture could also 
be a disadvantage (Kshetri, 2014) since so many potential targets exist in its extensive 
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cyberspace (Lim et al., 2013). In addition, it is hard for the South Korean government to 
control cyberspace because much of the space is in the private sector, in contrast with 
North Korea. One reason why South Korea does not respond well against North Korea’s 
attacks is that the role division and role sharing between organizations is not always 
settled (Boo, 2013). South Korea does provide diverse public services in cyberspace via 
its electronic-government service. A number of services, such as distribution of important 
documents and issuing of administrative papers, are provided by wired or wireless 
communication channels. Although they are secured by encryption, digital signature, and 
other digital security technologies, additional defensive technologies are needed to 
protect against an advanced attack. Networks in the public sector could especially be a 
target because they have much personal and sensitive information. These networks can 
also be attractive if an attacker wants to make political effects because the availability of 
online public service is associated with the credibility of the country. The past DDoS 
attacks against the Websites of the Blue House and central government agencies are good 
examples. 
Many enterprises and people are connected to the Internet for their business. 
Although they do have security measures corresponding to the type of services and the 
scale of businesses, the measures are often weaker than those of the government. North 
Korea has attacked the private sectors, including the press, the media, and the finance 
companies. 
Vulnerabilities of the infrastructure sectors are hard to analyze because of the lack 
of open information. However, a report from the NIS suggests that North Korea has an 
offensive capability against electric-power facilities. In an attack against the Nonghyup 
Bank in 2011, North Korea succeeded in attacking a physically isolated intranet, which 
means that highly secured networks for infrastructure could also be attacked even though 
they are air-gapped. If critical infrastructure such as power plants and energy facilities are 
not available because of cyber attacks, the collateral damage could be significant. In 2014, 
there was an attack on Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. (KHNP; Y. Kim, 2015), 
although it did not affect physical systems.  
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The military sector is managed by the cyber command. ROK military units 
operate diverse intranets according to security levels, purposes, and organizations. The 
intranets are generally isolated networks from the Internet and are divided broadly into 
resource-management systems and battlefield-management systems (K. Choi, 2012). 
Resource-management systems are monitored and controlled by the Cyber Command, 
but the battlefield-management systems are not because the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 
Air Force, Navy, and Army operate their own systems, such as Korea Joint Command 
and Control System (KJCCS), the Air Force Command and Control System (AFCCS), 
the Korea Navy Command and Control System (KNCCS), and the Army Tactical 
Command Information System (ATCIS). Since the roles of the Cyber Command are 
expanding, the South Korean military can be vulnerable during joint operations if 
monitoring of the battlefield management systems is not integrated. There were many 
cyber attacks and especially cyber espionage on the ROK armed forces and the MND. 
For example, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), which is in charge of the 
development of military technologies as a subordinate organization of the MND, was 
hacked by an unknown hacking group in 2014, and hundreds of confidential military 
documents were leaked (J. Yoon, 2014). While this attack was not attributed to North 
Korea, it shows a vulnerability in military confidential networks.  
Thus, South Korea has vulnerabilities in every sector. These vulnerabilities can 
give adversaries many chances from which to choose targets. Adversaries could exploit 
vulnerabilities of the public and military sectors for cyber espionage and could attack 
private-sector vulnerabilities for cyber psychological operations or propaganda. 
Moreover, if adversaries want to cause considerable damage, they could exploit the 
vulnerabilities of infrastructure. If they intend to begin full-scale war, they would try to 
exploit the vulnerabilities of military networks. 
C. CYBER ATTACKS FROM NORTH KOREA AGAINST SOUTH KOREA 




North Korea frequently uses cyber attacks as a provocation to achieve the 
government’s political objectives as well as send propaganda and make armed 
provocations against South Korea. Their targets of provocations are not limited to South 
Korean government or military, but also include civilian properties since their main 
purpose is to perturb the South Korean people and undermine public confidence in the 
South Korean government (IUE, 2014). Targeting civilians is against the international 
laws of armed conflict, but North Korea does not respect international law. This section 
identifies the major features of North Korea’s cyber attacks by observing previous cyber 
attacks that were attributed to the North Korean government. The North Korean 
government threatens South Korea in cyberspace similarly to how it does so with 
conventional armed forces. 
The first cyber attack that was clearly attributed to North Korea was in 2004. 
There have been changes in targets and techniques with attacks over the last 10 years. 
North Korea’s cyber attacks tend to occur in certain periods related to political, military, 
and cultural events, in contrast with attacks of cyber criminals. And the type of targets 
has changed over time from government Websites to the private sector. 
2. Details of North Korean Attacks and South Korean Responses 
We review North Korea’s cyber attacks chronologically. 
a. 2004 
On June 10, 2004, the South Korea National Assembly, the Coast Guard, KIDA, 
the Atomic Energy Research Institute, and private institutes were attacked by malware 
that appeared to be coming from China (H. Kim, 2010). According to statistics, among 
301 damaged computers, 222 devices belonged to the government, and 79 computers 
were for private companies and universities. Based on the analysis, the origin of the 
attack was China, but the IP addresses were Chinese ones being leased by North Korea. 
According to Chae’s analysis, secret information related to national security was leaked 
for six months (Chae, 2013). In addition, HP Security Research indicated that North 
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Korea accessed South Korean military wireless communication networks (HP Security 
Research, 2014). 
South Korea recognized the domestic cyber weaknesses from this incident, so the 
government established a National Cyber Security Center and related regulations (Chae, 
2013). However, the investigation encountered obstacles due to lack of cooperation by 
the Chinese government. International cooperation is important for cyber-attack 
investigation and responses. 
b. 2005 
North Korea penetrated South Korea’s military communication channel in 2005 
during Ulchi Focus Lens, the annual combined military exercise with the United States 
(Ventre, 2011). South Korea’s Defense Security Command revealed 33 military wireless 
connections were reached to North Korea (K. Kim, 2005). There is little available 
information since the target was a military network. Because North Korea treats the 
combined exercises as preparations for the invasion of North Korea, the attack could have 
been a protest of the exercise.  
c. 2006 
According to (HP Security Research, 2014), the U.S. State Department was 
attacked by unknown entities in cyberspace in June 2006 (HP Security Research, 2014). 
At that time, the United States and North Korea were carrying on a conversation about 
North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons. Although the detailed information is not 
publicly open, the South Korean military reported that North Korea’s Unit 121 was 
implicated in this attack. This attack likely intended to strengthen bargaining power 
against the United States.  
d. 2007 
In March 2007, the Third Republic of Korea Army (TROKA) Command and the 
Center for Chemical Safety Management of National Institute of Environment were 
attacked in cyberspace (Mansourov, 2014). After the hackers obtained certificate 
passwords from TROKA to access the center, they stole information related to chemical-
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accident response. This information was related to approximately 700 enterprises and 
organizations associated with chemicals. South Korea spent about seven months 
identifying this cyber attack, and the potential damage was estimated to be bigger than 
the identified information leakage since it covered a long period. There was no strong 
evidence that North Korea was responsible for it, but South Korea’s government 
announced that the malware was from a foreign country, and it could have been from 
North Korea (S. Lee, 2009). 
In addition, (HP Security Research, 2014) claimed that North Korea tested a kind 
of cyber weapon, a logic bomb, in October 2007. In response, the international 
community imposed sanctions on the import of related devices and technology to North 
Korea (Ventre, 2011). 
e. 2008 
North Korea in 2008 sent malicious emails with Trojan Horses to the South 
Korean military, and social engineering attempts such as spear phishing were also 
identified (Ventre, 2011). 
f. 2009 
A significant cyber attack occurred in July 2009. It was a DDoS attack targeting 
21 Websites, including government sites such as the Blue House, MND, NIS, media, and 
financial institutes. According to (Chae, 2013), North Korean hackers used sophisticated 
methods, such as automatic deletion of source files and destruction of zombie PC’s hard 
disks to hide evidence and the attacker’s identity. The attack exploited over 400 servers 
in the world to make tracing hard. The total number of bots was approximately 20,000 
devices. Among them, 12,000 infected computers were located in South Korea, and 
others were in foreign countries (Mansourov, 2014). 
This attack did not target only South Korea. On July 4, the first phase of the attack 
occurred against U.S. government Websites. On July 7 and 9, similar attacks occurred in 
South Korea. Some IP addresses that were used for this attack were the IP addresses of 
the North Korean Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications that were leased from 
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Chinese ISP (H. Kim, 2010). Although the command-and-control of this attack was 
conducted from the United Kingdom, the attack could be attributed to North Korea 
because the attack codes targeted websites in the Korean language (Carr, 2011). This 
attack on the availability of targeted systems is definitely different than the previous 
cyber-espionage or penetration attacks because it had a certain scenario with specific 
targets, methods, and schedules (Boo, 2013). Apparently, this attack was meant to test the 
resilience of South Korea and the United States in cyberspace (Ventre, 2011). 
Since this DDoS attack hurt the availability of public services, it made a large 
impact. The South Korean government realized the importance of inter-organization 
cooperation for early detection and proper response to attacks (Chae, 2013). South Korea 
thus established a Cyber Command (Kshetri, 2014). 
Although the attack against South Korea started July 7, the first attack occurred in 
the United States on July 4, which is the important U.S. national holiday of Independence 
Day. In June, a month before the attack, the North Korean government officially 
announced that they were fully ready for any form of high-tech war. Based on these facts, 
the attack could be considered a well-prepared attack against the ROK-U.S. alliance (HP 
Security Research, 2014). 
g. 2010 
In 2010, several cyber attacks involving information leakage were targeted 
against South Korean military officers via malware (Ventre, 2011). In July, there was a 
DDoS attack against the Blue House, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the 
Korean Exchange Bank, and Naver.com, but the damage was not as great as that of the 
DDoS attack in 2009 (Mansourov, 2014). Although the attack was not large-scale, it 
appeared that North Korea was using a cyber attack to deliver their political intentions 
because this attack occurred in the same period as the previous year with a similar type of 
method. According to the South Korea National Policy Agency, this DDoS attack was 
conducted by the same botnets that were used for the massive DDoS attack in 2009, and 
the signature of malware was also the same (Y. Jung, 2010). In 2010, the South Korean 
MND established a Cyber-Protection Policy Team (Kshetri, 2014). 
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h. 2011 
On January 3, 2011, a South Korean private website, Free North Korea Radio, 
was attacked by North Korea. This attack was likely a counterattack because users of the 
South Korean Internet site DCinside.com had hacked a North Korean external website, 
uriminzokkiri.com (Mansourov, 2014). Free North Korea Radio is a private organization 
that mainly consists of North Korean defectors, and it broadcasts news about North Korea 
such as the North Korean government’s human rights violations as well as developments 
in South Korea. Unusually, this attack did not use proxy servers, but came from North 
Korea directly, which indicated that they wanted the attack to be attributed. 
In March 2011, a more massive DDoS attack than that of 2009 was conducted 
against the South Korean government and private services. Over 700 servers and 100,000 
infected PCs were mobilized for this attack (Chae, 2013). The attack was similar to 
previous attacks known to be from North Korea (Ahn, 2013). The attack used illegal 
game sites to spread malware that infected PCs and set up botnets (Mansourov, 2014). 
In April 2011, South Korean bank Nonghyeop was hacked and their banking 
service was paralyzed for several days because much data in their network was damaged 
(Chae, 2013). The South Korean prosecutor announced that this attack was conducted by 
North Korea’s RGB after seven months of a sophisticated preparatory period (Park, 
2011). This was a more developed attack than the previous DDoS attacks since it caused 
monetary losses in the real world and involved an attempt of an Advanced Persistent 
Threat (APT; Boo, 2013). McAfee, a U.S. security company, did identify signatures of 
North Korea in the attack codes (Cisneros, 2015). In addition, (HP Security Research, 
2014) reported that North Korea attempted a DDoS attack on transportation 
infrastructures such as Incheon International Airport. 
i. 2012 
In June 2012, North Korea attacked the website of Joongang Ilbo, a conservative press 
company (Mansourov, 2014). The South Korean Cyber Terror Response Team in the 
National Police Agency reported that the IP addresses of this attack were related to the 
North Korean Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (Park, 2013). Before the attack, 
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the North Korean government did threaten South Korean media that reported North 
Korea’s issues negatively. The North Korea’s General Staff Department announced that 
several media in South Korea insulted the leader of North Korea as Adolf Hitler, and 
North Korea would attack Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo, the Korea 
Broadcasting system, the Seoul Broadcasting System, and the Munhwa Broadcasting 
Corporation, among others, if South Korea did not apologize (Jun, 2012). Databases 
related to news articles and pictures were destroyed by this attack. Also in 2012, South 
Korea established a Cyber-Defense School with Korea University, and the school 
cultivated 30 cyber experts for the military section (Kshetri, 2014). 
j. 2013 
In March 2013, North Korea attacked PCs, servers, and automated teller machines 
of six broadcast companies and financial institutes, causing deletion of data and service 
interruptions (Chae, 2013). This attack was an APT attack similar to the Nonghyeop 
hacking in 2011, with several months of preparation (Boo, 2013). According to (HP 
Security Research, 2014), an Internet and communications company in South Korea, LG 
U+, was also attacked similarly, and there was defacement on the damaged Web page 
with a message, “Hacked by Whois Team.” “Whois” is occasionally used by South 
Korea’s white hat team, RAON_ASRT, but given the targets, it seems more likely that 
North Korea used this word intentionally to shift the blame. 
According to the detailed analysis, this attack was prepared over eight months, 
and approximately 57,000 PCs and servers were damaged (B. Lee, 2015). The hackers 
first stole information from internal PCs of targeted facilities to find network 
vulnerabilities and spread malware to PCs attached to the networks via fake antivirus 
software. In this process, the IP addresses belonging to North Korea were identified 13 
times, and many intermediate pathways used were identical to their past attacks. In 
addition, about 30 types of malware among the total 76 malware used for this attack were 
reused from previous North Korean attacks. A new feature was that North Korean 
hackers exploited vulnerabilities in the groupware of targeted networks, such as 
electronic-document transfer systems. They also tried to bypass South Korean domestic 
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antivirus software, using its updated server to spread their malware (HP Security 
Research, 2014). 
The March 13 attack showed that the level of North Korea’s cyber threat was 
higher than the attack in 2009 (B. Lee, 2015). There were significant losses, such as a 
decrease in markets from the degrading of South Korea’s international credibility. 
According to (B. Lee, 2015) research, the damage estimation of this attack was 805.1 
billion won, which was 15 times bigger than the damage of the attack in 2009, 54.4 
billion won. 
In April 2013, the international hacking group Anonymous attacked North 
Korea’s networks (HP Security Research, 2014). Apparently in response, malicious 
smartphone applications infected approximately 20,000 devices in South Korea from 
May to September (Mansourov, 2014). These malicious applications were spread as free 
mobile games, and they had eavesdropping and video-recording capabilities. 
In June 2013, North Korea conducted a large cyber attack against South Korea’s 
government and think tanks such as the MOU, the Sejong Institute, the KIDA, and the 
Hyundai Merchant Marine (Mansourov, 2014). The DDoS attack was attributed to the 
DarkSeoul hacking group, which is related to North Korea’s Lab 110 (HP Security 
Research, 2014). This attack was different from the previous attack in March because the 
malware did not use any timer and destroyed hard drives immediately when the system 
was infected (B. Lee, 2015). Since this attack spread malware via shared folders of 
intranets, and administrative passwords were required to access share folders, this attack 
was a type of APT attack that obtained passwords in advance. Furthermore, in September, 
Kimsuky malware that targeted South Korea’s think tanks was detected (HP Security 
Research, 2014). 
To reinforce cyber-related organization in response to North Korea’s continuing 
cyber threats, the South Korean MND established a Cyber Policy Department, and the 
NIS announced that the Third Department would focus more on monitoring of 
cyberspace and telecommunications (Kshetri, 2014). Moreover, the South Korean 
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government stated that they would double the budget related to cyber security and 
cultivate 5,000 cyber experts every year. 
k. 2014
In 2014 there were no large-scale cyber attacks like in 2013, but North Korea 
appeared to attack Sony Pictures Entertainment in response to the film The Interview, 
which depicted the assassination of a North Korean leader (HP Security Research, 2014). 
The FBI attributed this cyber attack to North Korea and made a conclusion that the attack 
was destructive malware; the data theft included “proprietary information as well as 
employees’ personally identifiable information and confidential communications” (FBI, 
2014). Experts have estimated the damages were up to $100 million (Richwine, 2014). 
The U.S. government issued an executive order on strong sanctions as a response. 
In December 2014, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Ltd (KHNP) was 
hacked, and the South Korean Public Prosecutor’s Office claimed North Korea as the 
source based on traces of IP addresses that belonged to North Korea (Y. Kim, 2015). 
After the hacking group first tampered with retired employees’ email accounts, they then 
stole and posted some of the company’s internal information, such as blueprints of 
nuclear facilities, on social network services (NIS, 2015). The purpose of the attack 
appeared to be public disruption. In response to the increasing North Korean cyber threat, 
in 2014 South Korea made greater efforts to prepare organized responses. In April 2015, 
the South Korean government established the office of Cyber Security Secretary under 
the Office of National Security and enforced comprehensive countermeasures to 
strengthen cyber-security postures. 
l. 2015
In June 2015, North Korea’s external propaganda website uriminzokkiri.com was 
out of service for three weeks, and the North Korean government claimed that it was 
caused by U.S. cyber attacks (B. Lee, 2015) but provided no evidence. The reason that 
the website was nonfunctioning was not revealed. 
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3. Analysis
HP Security Research (2014) analyzed cyber activities related to North Korea 
from 2004 to 2014 in regard to malware and hacking. Cisnero (2015) did analysis that 
suggested that North Korea preferred attacks that had large effects regardless of the 
international laws of war because they attacked the private sector many times. These 
analyses suggest that North Korea’s cyber attacks have certain patterns in timing and 
political issues, and future attacks may often be predicted. 
The total number of major cyber attacks attributed to North Korea is 17 since 
2004. Many attacks occurred in March, April, and July. In March, there is an annual 
large-scale combined military exercise, Key Resolve (KR), involving the ROK and the 
United States. The information leakage in 2007, the massive DDoS attack in 2011, and 
the APT attack on the media and banks in 2013 occurred in March. North Korea has 
claimed that these combined military activities are preparations for the invasion of North 
Korea and has conducted large-scale military training in response during the same period. 
Apparently, the intention of the cyber attacks in March is to protest and disturb the 
exercises. Figure 5 shows monthly trends. 
Figure 5.  Monthly Statistics of North Korea’s Cyber Attacks from 2004 to 
2015  
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In June and July, there are several anniversaries of the ROK-U.S. alliance, such as 
the start of the Korean War, June 25, and U.S. Independence Day, July 4. The first 
massive DDoS attack was started on July 4, 2009, and the APT attack on South Korean 
media and banks were conducted on June 25, 2013. 
Furthermore, since the birthday of Kim Il-Sung, the first leader of North Korea, is 
April 15, the foundation day of the KPA is April 25, and the foundation day of the WPK 
is October 10, North Korea typically conducts large-scale armed protests or military 
training on these dates to show off their power to their people and the world. The logic 
bomb test in October 2007 and Nonghyeop hacking on April 4, 2011, occurred in 
conjunction with these historic events. 
For these reasons, South Korea should intensify its defensive posture from March 
to October. But cyber attacks occurred during other periods as reactions to events such as 
the DDoS attack on Free North Korea Radio in January 2011 and the attack on Sony 
Pictures Entertainment in November 2011. In addition, when North Korea has used APTs 
it prepared for several months with penetration of networks and exploitation of 
vulnerabilities. 
Overall, since the massive DDoS attack in 2009, large-scale cyber attacks have 
occurred every other year. In 2009, the relationship between North Korea and the ROK-
U.S. alliance deteriorated because a North Korean soldier shot a South Korean tourist, 
Wang-Ja Park  (K. Lee, 2008). The North Korean government launched a long-range 
ballistic missile in April 2009 (K. Kim, 2009), and North Korea did a second nuclear 
weapon test in May 2009 (T. Kim, 2009). In addition, the North Korean government 
announced that they were fully ready for any form of high-tech war in June 2009 (HP 
Security Research, 2014). After these events, North Korea attacked the United States and 
South Korea in July 2009. They also launched seven ballistic missiles on the same day of 
the cyber attack against the United States (Son, 2009).  
North Korean provocations continued. In September 2009, North Korea opened 
the floodgate of Hwang-Gang Dam without notice, and South Korean civilians were 
killed (K. Lee, 2009). In November, North Korean naval patrol ships invaded the 
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Northern Limit Line, the western sea border between South and North Korea, and South 
and North Korean naval ships engaged (D. Lee, 2009). In March 2010, North Korea 
conducted a torpedo attack on ROKS Choenan (M. Jung, 2010). During this state of 
tension, the North Korean government attacked government and private Websites in 
cyberspace, and finally they bombarded the South Korean island Yeonpyeongdo in 
November 2010 (D. Kim, 2010). The largest cyber attacks occurred in March and April 
2011. 
The chain of events from 2009 to 2011 shows the purpose of North Korea’s cyber 
attacks. They conducted strategic provocations to make themselves look powerful, such 
as launching missiles or doing nuclear testing. They hope these actions will allow them 
leverage in the Korean peninsula and will reinforce their bargaining power against the 
United States, but this has not worked. Yet they continue with these power plays 
nonetheless. These cases also suggest that North Korea considers their cyber capabilities 
as strategic assets like missiles and nuclear weapons. 
Since the 1990s, the North Korean government has practiced brinkmanship for 
getting economic support and protecting the regime by creating an atmosphere of conflict 
with nuclear tests and missile launches (IUE, 2014). In addition, the North Korean 
government believes that they can solve their urgent problem with nuclear weapons and 
long-range missiles that can threaten the United States directly in the Korean peninsula 
theater. The characteristics of these weapon systems are that they can threaten many 
distant objects. These characteristics are similar to those of cyber attacks since cyber 
attacks also could threaten many targets indiscriminately without the constraints of 
physical space. 
Figure 6 shows the timelines of cyber attacks and conventional provocations. 
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Figure 6.  Chart of North Korean Provocations 
 
 
This analysis suggests that if the relationship between the two Koreas worsens or 
if major real world provocations occur, it will be necessary to strengthen cyber-defense 
postures even when there are no symptoms related to cyberspace. 
By analyzing the changes in their cyber targets, we also can forecast future attack 
targets. From 2004 to 2008, most attacks were information-gathering from government 
and research agencies. However, since 2009, the North Korean government has 
conducted DDoS attacks against the private sector, such as media and financial institutes. 
In addition, North Korean hackers have increasingly seized internal groupware and anti-
virus systems, destroying internal systems instead of external systems. Damages have 
increased, and more resources and time are required for restoration. In addition, in 
December 2014, they hacked KHNP, part of the national infrastructure. 
So the targets of North Korea’s cyber attacks have shifted from intelligence 
collection to DDoS attacks and then to APT attacks on the private sector related closely 
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to the public. Following this trend, future targets are likely to be the infrastructure 
operated by private companies, which has weaker defenses because of the concentration 
on national cyber security by the establishment of Cyber Command in 2010 and NIS’ 
concentration on cyber security.  
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IV. FINDING EFFECTIVE RESPONSES
According to the analysis of Chapter III, the North Korean government 
conducts cyber attacks with strategic goals, much as it does with nuclear weapon tests 
and long-range missile launches. This shows that the North Korean government aims 
to achieve political goals by showing off their asymmetric capabilities. In fact, 
comparing military forces between South and North Korea in 2014, North Korea has 
1.5 times more field artilleries, 27 times more rocket launchers, and 7 times more 
submarines than South Korea, which means that artilleries and submarines are 
asymmetric forces for them (S. Kim, 2015). 
In this chapter, we investigate South Korea’s possible countermeasures against 
North Korea’s continuous cyber attacks. 
A. THE GOAL STATE 
The most important thing before finding proper responses is to define what South 
Korea’s ultimate goal state is. According to a Defense White Paper from the South 
Korean MND (MND, 2015), South Korea’s national defense has three objectives: 
“protecting the country from external military threats and invasion” (p.37), “supporting 
peaceful unification” (p.37), and “contributing to regional stability and world peace” 
(p.37). In terms of the situation in the Korean peninsula, these objectives could be 
interpreted as protecting South Korea from North Korean threats, deterring war in the 
Korean peninsula to support peaceful unification, alleviating military tension, and 
establishing a lasting peace. In cyberspace, the goals would be protecting South Korea’s 
information technology environment, assets, and resources from North Korea; deterring 
cyber war and alleviating tensions in cyberspace; and establishing a lasting peace in 
cyberspace. This means that South Korea should prepare good defensive 
countermeasures to protect cyber assets and develop coercive methods to encourage the 
North Korean government to stop cyber attacks without escalating a cyber arms race. 
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B. CONSIDERATIONS 
There are several considerations to find and assess countermeasures. 
1. Prevention of Escalation 
South Korea does not want to trigger a cyber arms race or escalation, although it 
should prepare defensive and offensive countermeasures. However, South Korea cannot 
concentrate only on defense in disregard of offense because a strong shield might cause 
North Korea to develop stronger weapons. Thus, South Korea should demonstrate 
possible counterattacks. The bargaining power in the real world can be reinforced by 
cyber coercion (Flemming & Rowe, 2015), and this can be achieved by showing 
offensive capabilities and will. 
Preparing and applying offensive cyber methods to coerce might cause a cyber 
arms race. Escalation could have serious and unpredictable consequences (Woods, 2015). 
Escalations could be more likely if the level of countermeasures is too high or targets of 
the countermeasures are not chosen well (Flemming, 2014). Joint coercion with cyber 
and conventional military forces might better prevent escalation since effects of 
conventional military forces are more predictable. As a result, to coerce without 
escalation, very sensitive procedures to set the level and targets of the counteractions are 
required. 
2. Legality and Ethics 
Other considerations are international legality and ethics. The North Korean 
government tends not to follow international law. It has negated or broken away from 
international treaties and rules many times. For example, in 1993, North Korea left the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop nuclear weapons. South Korea 
generally follows international law and rules. Although North Korean cyber-attack 
targets are expanding from the military and government to private sectors and 
infrastructure, South Korea could not attack such targets. According to the Tallinn 
Manual that provides guidelines for international cyber conflicts, “The civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of cyber attack” 
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(Schmitt, 2013, p. 113), “Cyber attacks, or the threat thereof, the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian populations, are prohibited” (Schmitt, 2013, 
p. 122), and “Attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless object indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population by means of cyber operation is prohibited” 
(Schmitt, 2013, p. 225). Even though the Tallinn Manual is not yet part of international 
law, South Korea cannot ignore it because the government puts great emphasis on 
international relationships since it has many connections to the rest of the world. If South 
Korea follows international guidelines, legitimacy of its countermeasures can be secured.  
3. Resources and Resiliency 
Cyberwarfare requires resources much like conventional warfare. Large expenses 
are not required to produce a single cyber weapon compared to advanced fighter jets, 
nuclear aircraft carriers, or precision-guided missiles. Although double the cost is 
required to make two identical fighter jets, computer viruses can be copied at very little 
cost. However, although the life cycle of fighter jets from development to retirement is 
decades, the life cycle in cyberspace is quite short because of the swift pace of 
development of information technology. Therefore, both cyber defense and offense will 
be expensive in the long run because both require constant new investments. Investing 
large amounts to establish a so-called perfect cyber protection system would be 
inefficient because it could become useless after the development of new attack methods. 
Similarly, a large investment in cyber weapons is also not efficient because cyber 
weapons usually cannot be reused as word of their effects spreads and patches of the 
vulnerabilities become available. Thus, cyberweapon offense and defense must be 
designed in moderation as just one part of a strategic offense and defense. 
4. Bargaining Power 
If defensive and offensive countermeasures in cyberspace also have effects in the 
real world, they could be more efficient. A desirable purpose of much cyber coercion 
could be to make the adversary return to the negotiating table (Woods, 2015), and 
bargaining power in the real world could be reinforced by cyber coercion (Flemming & 
Rowe, 2015). Usually, cessation of hostilities is negotiated between decision makers on 
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both sides. It is helpful to consider whether a proposed countermeasure will enhance 
bargaining power. Bargaining power could be strengthened if one side targets objects that 
the other side thinks are important, and the effect can be increased if the counter attack 
could be reversible. An example of reversible cyber activities is ransomware that 
encrypts a victim’s data, which means that nobody except for the attacker could decrypt it, 
followed by asking for a ransom. An example is the CryptoLocker that attacked 
approximately 234,000 computers from 2013 to 2014 (DOJ Office of Public Affairs, 
2014). Between countries, reversible measures could encourage parties to negotiate a 
solution quickly. 
C. DEFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES 
Despite news reports, the defender is not always powerless in cyberspace (Singer 
& Friedman, 2014). Attackers can choose a type, time, and target of attack, but they must 
infiltrate all protective layers to make their attack successful. Defenders could defend 
successfully if at least one of the protections succeeds in blocking the attack at a layer. 
Here we recommend some innovative defensive ways. 
1. Defensive Techniques 
Several cyber defensive countermeasures are possible based on the idea of active 
defense (Harrington, 2014): beaconing, threat counter-intelligence gathering, sinkholing, 
honeypots, and retaliatory hacking. Retaliatory hacking is more related to offensive 
countermeasures and is discussed later. Threat counter-intelligence gathering is beyond 
the scope of the technical means discussed here. 
Beaconing transmits the current user information, such as IP addresses, via an 
Internet connection when the stolen file is opened. This permits tracing of attacks when 
the attacker downloads information. By more sophisticated programming, beaconing can 
be upgraded to deletion of files or gaining control of the attacker’s computer. 
Honeypots are systems designed to attract attackers and record their methods 
(Harrington, 2014). This can be effective against file stealing, DDoS, malware 
installation for APT, and other kinds of attacks. Honeypots can collect information such 
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as penetration or scanning patterns (Fredrick, 2011). Honeypots are already deployed in 
many organizations for general cyber security purposes. 
Sinkholing intercepts malicious traffic from botnet clients by masquerading as 
one of its command-and-control servers (Harrington, 2014). Because redirecting from 
suspected domain names or IP addresses is required, support from the domain manager is 
necessary. 
2. Cyber Early-Warning System 
A cyber early-warning system provides a wider viewpoint to defense (Robinson, 
Jones, & Janicke, 2015). Many modern countries have a well-prepared early-warning 
system for conventional military attacks. A good cyber early-warning system should 
provide information about the current situation, the attacker, the targets, and the attack 
methods (Golling & Stelte, 2011). Early warning systems have the disadvantage that they 
only detect attacks after they are launched. Attribution and reverse-engineering to figure 
out who implemented a cyber attack and how it was done can take a long time. For 
example, after the cyber attack on June 25, 2013, approximately three weeks passed until 
the joint investigation group announced a result (I. Choi, 2013). 
Early warning for cyber attacks is closely related to social, economic, political 
and cultural issues (Sharma, Gandhi, Mahoney, Sousan, & Zhu, 2010). Cyber attacks 
motivated by political issues usually have five phases: latent tension, cyber 
reconnaissance, an initiating event, cyber mobilization, and a cyber attack (Carr, 2011). 
Since the purposes of North Korea’s cyber attacks are to reinforce their bargaining power 
and to achieve their political goals, we should see the five stages from them. That 
suggests that defense should be collecting a good deal of cyber data when an attack 
appears to be imminent. However, excessive information collecting can raise privacy and 
legal issues. In addition, it is not reasonable to collect more than one’s analytic 
capabilities. 
One thing that aids early-warning systems is that classification of cyber attack 
groups and prediction of attacks based on a cyber-defense operations framework is 
possible in advance (Kim, Park, Lee, & Lim, 2014). A good cyber-defense framework 
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has six stages. The first stage is detection, in which suspicious traffic or code is detected 
by intrusion-detection systems (IDSs), intrusion-prevention systems (IPSs), anti-virus 
software, and firewalls. The second stage extracts attack artifacts, which are analyzed and 
stored in a database together with any relevant open-source information. In this stage, 
signatures of the attack and its distinctive parameters are acquired. Signatures and 
parameters include such things as email sender identification, the sender’s IP address, 
hash values to figure out identical malicious attachment or malware, IP addresses of 
command-and-control servers, and related Internet addresses (URLs). The third stage 
tries to classify the attack group by using the parameters of the second phase. The fourth 
stage analyzes the attack group using digital evidence and timeline plotting, looking for 
patterns or preferred resources for the attack. The fifth stage makes predictions by 
monitoring the resources’ states. If an attacker tends to use a certain server to command 
its botnet, early warning can be provided when the server behaves atypically. The final 
phase is a reaction phase to prevent damage from similar future attacks by fixing 
vulnerabilities and blocking the attacking sites and protocols. 
3. Concept of Integrated Cyber Defense 
Another way to describe an integrated cyber defense (Cloud, 2007) is that it can 
be divided into technology employment, operational command and control, and 
operational employment. Technology employment consists of a cyber-sensor network 
similar to an air-surveillance radar, a cyber identify-friend-or-foe (IFF) system, and 
defensive cyber weapons similar to surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Operational 
command-and-control implements the operational chain of command-and-control in 
cyberspace. (Cloud, 2007) recommends a unified chain that removes ambiguity for 
efficient computer network operations. The operational employment concept consists of 
posture, maneuver, and recovery. Posture is related to protective measures that maintain 
survivability and operability of cyber assets by modification of the cyber readiness 
posture according to the situation. It can use cover, concealment, camouflage, hardening, 
deception, dispersal, and redundancy. Maneuver is associated with responses during 
attacks, such as attacking, defending, relocating, augmenting, withdrawing, and delaying. 
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Finally, recovery means restoring cyber capabilities, including battle damage assessment, 
containment, repair, and reconstitution. 
4. Building a South Korean Integrated Cyber Defense Based on Cyber 
Early-Warning System 
Today in South Korea the chain of command-and-control for cyber defense is 
controlled by the NIS. The MSIP and KISA are responsible for the private sector, and the 
MND and the cyber command are in charge of the military sector. After so many cyber 
attacks from North Korea over ten years, organizations are well-prepared to cooperate by 
devising methods for detection of threats and for sharing related information quickly. 
Cooperation with ISPs and sharing related information between associated organizations 
is also important (Harrington, 2014). 
Most of North Korea’s recent provocations by military forces occurred on the 
ground and the sea (Noh, 2015). North Korea has not provoked in the air because their 
airpower is inferior to that of South Korea and South Korea’s air defense system is 
working well. This is likely is because the Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC) 
integrates all radar information and shares it in a short time. This could be a model for the 
timely detection of cyber threats and sharing of cyber information, which are important 
parts of a cyber defense posture. 
South Korea can detect malicious activities on networks via IPSs, IDSs, firewalls, 
and beaconing, honeypots, sinkholing, and other techniques, monitor the detected 
information, and share the information with each organization. The National Policy 
Agency can operate cyber criminal investigation units for cyber crimes. Since North 
Korea’s cyber attacks have targeted civilians and private sectors as well as government 
and military organizations, and attacks on infrastructure are also expected in the future, a 
cyber early-warning system should be unified into one place, and the NIS is an 
appropriate place because they already have authority for overall cyber issues. However, 
unique, independent, or air-gapped intranets, such as military intranets for the MND and 
units, should be locally managed to avoid propagation of unnecessary information. For 
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example, the cyber command, the cyber-specialized organization under the MND, would 
be the suitable organization to conduct cyber early warning for military intranets. 
Controlling a limited number of aircraft in the air is different from handling the 
much more numerous items of information related to cyber threats and attacks from 
scattered information systems. A big-data handling approach is required, which is a key 
technological issue for integrated cyber defense. Furthermore, cooperation between the 
cyber early-warning system of the NIS and network infrastructures such as ISPs is 
necessary, much as the MCRC and the AOC must cooperate with the area-control center 
(ACC), which controls civilian air traffic. Also, North Korea’s cyber attacks tend to occur 
together with other strategic provocations, so for an integrated cyber early-warning 
system, overall intelligence analysis is required. Because the NIS is responsible for the 
national level of intelligence analyses, the NIS should provide this. 
Currently, each cyber organization detects and reports to its interagency, and 
interagencies report to the NIS. This structure could cause delays in sharing threat 
information since additional processing time for data integration might be required if 
each organization does not have unified procedures or policies. Furthermore, information 
consolidation with current-circumstance analysis and other intelligence is limited due to 
each organization’s limited intelligence capability. Thus, an integrated system at the NIS 
to consolidate information is required. Figures 7 and 8 display South Korea’s current and 
recommended NIS-centric cyber early-warning systems, respectively. 
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Figure 7.  South Korea’s Current Cyber Threat Information Reporting 
System 
 




5. Details of Cyber Early-Warning System 
If an integrated cyber early-warning system is established, the system should 
provide information about the subject of the attack, the target of the attack, and the 
method of the attack (Golling & Stelte, 2011). For early warning, the information about 
subject, target, and method could be incorrect, but immediacy is more important than 
accuracy because it is not for negotiations but for defense. 
An early-warning system should share threat information quickly. It should notify 
everyone of the approaching threat, prepare a defense posture, and reinforce cooperation. 
In the private sector, executives determine the balance between investment of cyber 
security and risk that can be afforded. The government cannot provide security devices 
and software to every individual and company, but close cooperation and intervention 
with ISPs and other network infrastructure is required because they have very important 
responsibilities on network availability. Moreover, critical infrastructure could cause 
enormous damage nationwide if it goes down, so critical assets such as power plants and 
water-supply plants require additional cooperation and supervision. Joint cyber-defense 
exercises and training are needed similarly to joint training for local military units, 
polices, and related organizations together. Furthermore, since North Korea has exploited 
vulnerabilities of South Korea’s domestic anti-virus software to spread malware, 
cooperation with foreign cyber-security companies is also necessary. 
After issuing warnings, several steps can reinforce the defensive posture, such as 
checking security configurations and doing backups. We could change network 
configurations at a certain level of threat much like how important military units change 
communication frequencies to specially assigned ones for an operation. This method can 
block concealed malware that communicates for activation. As we discussed previously, 
honeypots attract attackers, collect attack information, and defend real systems. During 
an attack, the existing honeypots are probably already identified by the attacker, but 
deploying a new one could be a good way to mitigate the attack. Honeypots can provide a 
new source of warnings (Cloud, 2007), and cyber-security companies and institutes could 
then recommend defensive techniques. 
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Despite upgraded cyber defense postures and preparations, damage could still 
occur from a cyber attack. Resiliency is important (Singer & Friedman, 2014), as is the 
recovery stage (Cloud, 2007). Even if services are not available due to DDoS attacks or 
important documents are spilled by cyber espionage, mitigation of damage and 
restoration of normal services in a short time is important. In the case of DDoS attacks, 
services can be restored by identifying and filtering malicious packets and attacking 
Internet addresses. It will also help to repair the bots in DDoS botnets and block their 
communications. There are several ways to respond immediately, such as source-address 
validation, secure configuration of the DNS server, disabling open recursive DNSs, and 
blocking and filtering (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers [ICANN] 
Security and Stability Advisory Company [SSAC], 2006). If systems are infected by 
destructive malware or logic bombs that damage storage, backups are critical. With early 
warning, organizations can set backup periods shorter than normal conditions while 
enhancing stability of backups by separating backup storage physically from the network 
to prevent attacks on it as well. In the case of stealing information, planting beacons or 
watermarks into the information could help mitigate damage. For example, a planted 
beacon could prohibit opening a file when the file is outside of the organization’s 
network. 
6. Assessments 
In terms of resources, diversified investment of limited resources in both 
protection and resiliency is desirable. If investment is focused on blocking attacks, the 
costs of loss will be high when the blocking fails. If the target is critical infrastructure 
such as a power plant, and it takes a long time to restore, damage to humans and other 
irrevocable damage could occur. On the other hand, if investment is focused on resiliency 
only, services would have outages frequently even though they could be fixed in a short 
time. An approximate calculation method for damage of downtime due to DDoS attacks 
(Dubendorfer, Wagner, & Plattner, 2004) says that costs of loss increase with the amount 
of downtime. A very long downtime from one significant attack could make a big loss, as 
well as a high level of accumulated downtime from frequent outages. 
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If warnings can be provided by an early-warning system and related events, it is 
possible to identify periods that require additional defensive capabilities. With finite 
resources, utilizing them for production parts such as research and development during 
ordinary days and switching resources to defense at other times is more effective than 
using a constant amount of resources at all times. 
In collecting more information to provide more accurate warnings, several legal 
issues can occur concerning how much information should be collected and handled. 
When information is collected from foreign countries, legal cooperation is required. 
Privacy problems can occur if excessive information is collected, so it is required to 
identify and gather essential information only with advance preparation of the associated 
regulation. 
If a victim country provides objective damage assessments and attributions that 
can be accepted by international society, its bargaining power at a negotiation table could 
be stronger. Even though there are no military logos as with conventional military forces, 
attribution in cyber space is possible due to advanced technology like evidence in files 
and network traffic (Rowe, 2015). Attribution via files is conducted by similarity of code 
and data, and attribution via traffic is possible with back-tracing and beaconing. Usually, 
it is hard to hold an entire country responsible for the cyber attack; for example, even if a 
blackhat in the United States hacks the South Korean government, the government cannot 
claim U.S. responsibility without detailed evidence that the U.S. government sponsors the 
hacker. However, in the situation of North Korea, North Korea’s Internet connections are 
so strongly controlled by the North Korean government that there is little possibility that 
cyber attacks from North Korea are not related to the government. 
Other factors can also affect bargaining power from the viewpoint of attackers 
(Pillar, 1983), but they are not suitable to defensive measures. Information and 
intelligence capabilities could, however, strengthen bargaining power (Ko & Kim, 2009) 
because of the importance of objective damage assessments and robust evidence of 
attribution. 
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D. OFFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES 
Counteracting an adversary’s cyber attacks in cyberspace is similar to the concept 
of retaliatory hacking mentioned by (Harrington, 2014). He argued that this hacking back 
from private companies to respond to cyber crimes could make many legal and ethical 
problems. Both private companies’ activities that are regulated by domestic laws and 
internationally activities that are associated with international laws could face many legal 
and ethical problems before even discussing effectiveness. In this section, we discuss 
suitable offensive measures to achieve South Korea’s cyber goal states, such as 
protection of South Korea’s information technology (IT) environment, deterrence of 
cyber war, and establishment of persistent peace in cyberspace. As we discussed, since 
offensive methods could face more legal and ethical issues than defensive measures, we 
should approach them more carefully. 
Cyber counter attacks are conducted by cyber weapons. Cyber weapons can be 
defined as weapons related to software to achieve desirable effects and a type of program 
that is modified to control the adversary’s computers and devices (Rowe, 2015). In 
addition, (Rowe, 2015) mentioned that cyber attacks are attempts to subvert the 
adversary’s computers to give the attacker advantages, and usually sabotage of the 
opponent’s system is the main purpose. In this section, we review existing research 
related to applicable options to seek for effective offensive countermeasures in terms of 
prevention of escalation and reinforcement of bargaining power as well as international 
laws and ethics, and examine options based on considerations.  
1. Targets 
Targeting is the first consideration to achieve the goal in cyberspace that deters 
North Korea’s cyber threats by offensive responses. North Korea does not have many 
activities on the Internet, and most domestic data is distributed by intranets. For this 
reason, possible cyber targets in North Korea could be divided into targets on the Internet 
and targets on intranets. 
North Korea’s intranets are physically disconnected from the Internet, and North 
Korean people can access official media and information provided by the government 
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through the intranets (HP Security Research, 2014). The military and government 
organizations operate separate intranets for classified information. There might be more 
effective targets in the intranets than the Internet, but detailed targeting is difficult 
because it is hard to connect to the intranets. 
Most Internet services of North Korea provide North Korean propaganda to the 
outside world. Although many cyber attacks from North Korea have originated in third 
countries, the attacks in 2014 were from the IP addresses that were managed by North 
Korean Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, so North Korea has used their Internet 
resources for cyber attacks (Y. Kim, 2014). As a result, cyber targets in the North Korean 
Internet environment could be divided into propaganda services and cyber attack 
resources. Although the North Korean entities on the Internet are less effective to attack 
than entities in the intranets, they are technically easier to access from the outside world. 
First of all, if attribution and the origin of the attack are solid, South Korea could 
consider the resources of the cyber attack in North Korea as possible targets since they 
could satisfy the principle of proportionality (Rowe, 2010). Second, because the North 
Korea government maintains their systems by controlling information to the people and 
by international propaganda to the outside world, the government responds strongly to 
denigration of their leadership, for example, distribution of negative information of Kim 
Jong-un (IUE & Ministry of Unification, 2014). In this context, the propaganda services 
can be good targets on the Internet. Synthetically, counterattacks to North Korea’s cyber-
offensive capabilities and obstructions of their propaganda activities could be good 
targets to send South Korea’s message successfully. Alternatively, a good attack need not 
harm North Korea at all, just provide accurate information about the outside world on 
their intranets, since the North Korean government fears this information so much. 
Although the best way to select targets is to choose targets that can make the 
biggest impacts, it is very difficult to choose targets that we cannot attack technically or 
targets that are risky to attack. For these reasons, recommendation of targets should be 
considered with attack methods. The following sections discuss possible attack methods. 
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2. The Stuxnet Computer Worm 
According to media reports in 2014, the South Korean armed forces plan to 
cooperate with U.S. forces in cyberspace, which includes developing Stuxnet-like cyber 
weapons (BBC, 2014). Stuxnet, as revealed in 2010, is considered the first cyber weapon, 
and it has capabilities to attack precisely targeted facilities, such as centrifuges in Iranian 
nuclear enrichment facilities (Kerr, Rollins, & Theohary, 2010). Although the attack was 
not attributed to any country, many researchers estimate that there were national-level 
organizations behind this weapon because sufficient financial support, expertise 
associated with many technical fields besides computer science, and intelligence 
capabilities to collect information related to targets are required for development of this 
kind of weapon. Stuxnet was a computer worm that attacked a Siemens supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system (Kerr et al., 2010). It likely spread to 
physically isolated networks by a thumb drive. This worm only did physical damage to 
Iranian nuclear facilities, but also infected SCADA systems in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, 
Germany, China, and the United States, as well as Iran. 
Stuxnet has been criticized because its code still lingers on many other machines 
after the sabotage of Iranian nuclear programs. Ethical cyber attackers should be 
responsible to repair damages of cyber attacks (Rowe, 2015). Although the size of the 
Stuxnet’s effects was reduced by anti-virus software after exposure of its existence, it was 
not perfectly removed. 
Nevertheless, the Stuxnet code appears to have been developed by careful and 
sophisticated processes to achieve its goals, in contrast with cyber attacks from criminal 
organizations. It caused physical damage only to targeted objects and it successfully 
spread to physically separated networks. The first characteristic suggests the cyber 
weapons can be precision-guided, and the second characteristic suggests that it is possible 
to attack precise targets in North Korean cyberspace even though they have limited 
Internet connections.  
 58 
3. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
DDoS attacks were conducted by North Korea against South Korea’s public and 
private Websites in 2009 and 2011. Most DDoS attacks are based on botnets (Radunovic, 
2013). A botnet is a network of zombie PCs that are hijacked and infected to perform 
tasks by attackers, and are controlled remotely by command-and-control servers. 
Attackers deplete resources of targeted systems, such as processing power, memory, or 
bandwidth, with bogus requests and traffic from bots. The estimated costs to form a 
DDoS botnet that could attack national-level targets are 6,000 euros (Radunovic, 2013). 
Recently the ROKAF announced that they would purchase long-range air-to-air missiles 
named Taurus, which have a 500km attack range and cost 2 billion wons each, equal to 2 
million dollars (Park, 2015). DDoS botnets are a considerably cheaper option with global 
attack capabilities. 
4. Cyber Attacks for Coercion 
Adversaries’ weapon systems, such as air-defense systems or cyber units, could 
also be targets for cyber coercion (Flemming, 2014). Cyber attacks on weapon systems 
do not attack overall war capabilities, but attack essential parts of systems to either make 
the systems unreliable or cause adversaries to consider their systems to be unreliable. 
Most combatants will not risk conflict with infected weapon systems at the risk of their 
lives. Attacking on opponents’ cyber units could undermine cyber offensive capabilities 
when both sides use cyber capabilities offensively. 
Cyber attacks can also be on military supply chain and associated networks, 
manufacturing processes, and databases (Woods, 2015). An encryption attack of 
adversaries’ software managing supply chains could be effective for cyber coercion. 
Although tension might escalate if victims respond with counterattacks, their trust of their 
system’s integrity could be decreased. Furthermore, if an attacker possesses reversible 
capabilities to decrypt encrypted targets, they could hold an advantage at the negotiation 
table. Another strategy is DDoS attacks to hinder availability of adversaries’ 
communication network for military supply, but they may not be enough to affect victims 
because their durations are limited. A third strategy is attacks on military manufacturing 
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processes that embed backdoors or malware in adversaries’ key systems to control them. 
Victims have several options, such as negotiating with coercers, using other weapon 
systems, or repairing compromised systems, but unavailability of weapon systems for 
preplanned operations means strategic weaknesses. However, extensive plans and 
operations are required to embed a cyber weapon during a manufacturing process, and 
there are risks that tensions will escalate rapidly if this embedding is uncovered by the 
victim. 
We should prepare cyber weapons for a full-scale war to handle every eventuality; 
we should develop many levels and kinds of cyber weapons just as an air force has many 
kinds of air munitions according to range, explosive power, and penetration power. 
However, offensive cyber coercion in response to cyber provocation in ordinary times 
has the more limited goals of mitigating adversaries’ future attacks and preventing 
escalation. From this point of view, among the suggestions from (Woods, 2015), precise 
encryption attacks on valuable assets of opponents would be the most effective because 
damage from the attacks can be reversed in a short time after cessation of hostilities.  
5. Recommendations: Possible Cyber Attacks 
Collateral damage, difficulties of damage localization of cyber weapons, and 
direct damage from cyber attacks could be redeemed to a certain degree by reversibility 
(Rowe, 2010). Damage cannot always be recovered fully in some cases such as time-
sensitive operations. Nevertheless, using reversible cyber attacks has advantages for 
cyberwarfare. If attackers provide recovery or assume responsibility for the damages, 
criticism of the attack could be reduced. Reversibility could also provide strategic 
flexibility. According to the international laws of war, counterattacks are justified when 
conducted by the principle of proportionality. However, results from activities in 
cyberspace are hard to predict because of the complexity and cascading effects in virtual 
space. Reversibility could provide a chance to reverse some or all parts of attacks if they 
were excessive (Rowe, 2010). However, reversibility could be less possible over time due 
to victims’ responses. 
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Reversibility can be achieved using encryption attacks, obfuscating attacks, 
withholding-information attacks, or resource-deception attacks (Rowe, 2010). Encryption 
attacks affect adversaries’ availability of data or programs by encrypting it in traffic or in 
storage. Obfuscating attacks modify data on computer systems to impede them, but do 
something other than encrypt it. Withholding-information attacks prevent adversaries’ 
data handling by intercepting their traffic with deployment of man-in-the-middle 
interceptors. Resource-deception attacks cause adversaries inconvenience with bogus 
error messages about system resources. 
Consider how South Korea could deploy a reversible cyber attack against North 
Korea. Following Chapter 2, North Korea uses their own original operating system based 
on Linux and applications, and their Internet connections are limited. The fact that North 
Korea uses only one version of an operating system means that South Korea has a 
simplified task in finding vulnerabilities. On the other hand, limited connections to the 
Internet in North Korea mean that South Korea’s available targets are limited, and 
additional approaches are needed to access air-gapped systems. In contrast with the 
Internet environment, scanning and footprinting are very limited since they require direct 
connections to North Korea’s intranets. Additional efforts from intelligence agencies and 
conventional espionage activities are required. 
North Korea also has a vulnerability in its dependence of cyber resources on 
foreign countries, especially China. Due to lack of a production infrastructure, North 
Korea depends on importation of computers and network devices. A cyber weapon could 
be embedded in Chinese products that would be exported to North Korea (Woods, 2015). 
But there is little possibility that the Chinese government would approve, and an attempt 
to install malware in Chinese manufacturers without any conversation with the Chinese 
government could significantly hurt relations between South Korea and China. So, 
diplomatic conversations to reduce support from China to North Korea would be a better 
choice than direct deployment of cyber weapons to Chinese manufacturers. 
Another method could construct new separate data-communication channels for 
deployment of cyber weapons (Peterson, 2013) using a Power Pwn that connects to 
separate wireless networks and looks like a harmless power cable, products that provide 
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wireless networks and look like a plug-in air cleaner, or installation of wireless network 
cards into their network devices or servers. North Koreans near the border between China 
and North Korea are already using mobile phones illegally since Chinese mobile 
coverage reaches them (Yeom, 2015). If modified devices are installed into their intranet 
near this border area where Chinese mobile data network coverage reaches, connection to 
North Korean intranets could be established via the Internet. Since this attempt requires 
installing such devices behind the North Korean border, it is more dangerous than pure 
cyber activities. 
The next consideration is attack points. According to the principle of 
proportionality, after robust attribution of North Korea’s cyber provocations, the Internet 
resources that were used for cyber attacks against South Korea would be the most 
justified attack points. This is similar to the situation after North Korea’s land-mine 
provocations in 2015 when South Korea started a broadcasting campaign of 
psychological warfare as a response. Extraordinarily at this time, North Korea asked for 
conversations with the South Korean government to stop the psychological operations 
(Cheon & Kim, 2015), the first such response during the last 19 years since the 
submarine penetration provocation in 1996 (Jang, 2015). The North Korean government 
is very sensitive about psychological operations against their soldiers and people, and 
these can be good targets. 
Thus, it could be very effective if South Korea could penetrate North Korean 
internal networks that are used by their people. However, not much is known about the 
North Korean intranet. If North Korea’s few media Internet Websites such as Rodong 
(http://www.rodong.rep.kp/) have similarities to intranet sites, it could be very helpful to 
figure out the mechanisms of flow between them. Also, since the North Korean 
government is afraid that their people could get more outside information about the world, 
it can be effective to change their sites’ contents to include news. 
In addition, because joint coercion with conventional forces enhances bargaining 
power and prevents escalation (Flemming, 2014), South Korea should consider joint 
coercion or counterattacks with conventional capabilities. In addition, joint operations 
could include psychological operations (Cheon & Kim, 2015). 
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6. Assessment 
The recommended cyber attacks should not have a high possibility of escalation 
or creating an arms race. Considering North Korea’s limited Internet infrastructure, if 
South Korea attacks it, the North Korean government should not be able to counterattack 
quickly with the compromised resources. And attacks on the North Korean government’s 
propaganda services should be less disruptive to the country than North Korea’s 
thoughtless targeting to public and private sectors of South Korea, so the provocation is 
less. From the strategic point of view, reversibility could be valuable because it could 
provide capabilities to recover damage in a short time and gives the flexibility to use 
other forms of coercion if cyber coercion is ineffective. Thus, the risk of escalation is 
relatively less than those of viruses, worms, or other methods with hard-to-predict results. 
Developing offensive countermeasures uses national resources. However, the cost 
of constructing a classic cyber attack tool like a DDoS botnet is only 6,000 euros, which 
is considerably less expensive than development and acquisition of conventional weapons 
(Radunovic, 2013). 
Reversible cyber attacks have advantages in negotiation. The adversary may have 
enough resources and time to recover by itself, but the compromised service is not 
available during the long repairing process, which means significant losses and damage. 
With reversible cyber attacks, there is an incentive to negotiate an end to the conflict, 
because coercers hold key information to recover the compromised services in a short 
time (Pillar, 1983). It can also be useful to deliver a message that says there will be more 
powerful attacks if the adversary conducts additional hostile activities.  
There are also ethical issues that occur with cyber weapons that need to be 
considered (Rowe, 2015). One issue is whether justification of cyber attacks is possible. 
Counterattacks against pure cyber attacks are hard to justify because of the difficulty of 
attribution in cyberspace. However, in the case of North Korea, offensive cyber 
capabilities and resources for cyber attacks such as Internet connections and devices are 
strongly controlled by the North Korean government, which means cyber attacks from 
North Korea may be relatively easy to attribute to the North Korean government. A 
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second issue is the problem of product tampering and perfidy (Rowe, 2015). Since cyber 
attacks involve manipulation of existing software and data without approval, this could 
violate end-user license agreements for software. However, in North Korea, software is 
owned by the North Korean government. Also because cyber attacks are more nonlethal 
than conventional attacks, this tampering could be excused (Strawser & Denning, 2014). 
The third issue is the unreliability of cyber weapons (Rowe, 2015) because cyber 
attacks depend on vulnerabilities that may disappear unpredictably, including connections 
that could be blocked after launching attacks. However, reversible attacks with self-
attribution could reverse collateral damage to noncombatants of multiple ineffective 
attacks, so possible problems related to this issue could be reduced. A fourth issue is 
related to repairing damage from cyber attacks since ethical coercers should try to make 
an effort to repair their damage. This could be more easily achieved by reversible attack 
with self-attribution than with other types of cyber attacks. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
North Korea has conducted a range of cyber attacks against the ROK-U.S. 
alliance as provocations over the last 10 years. These cyber provocations are intended to 
press the United States and ROK as much as nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, 
and armed provocations at the border do on the strategic level. However, even though 
South Korea has highly advanced information technologies, its government has not 
responded well in cyberspace due to difficulty of control, ethical issues, and worries 
about escalation. This has enabled the North Korean government to utilize offensive 
cyber capabilities mostly with impunity. 
North Korea’s cyber attacks were conducted to reinforce their bargaining power 
obtained by physical provocation, which suggests that South Korea also should respond 
properly in cyberspace as well as physical space. To find effective countermeasures for 
South Korea, this study compared each of the two Koreas’ cyber capabilities and 
analyzed previous North Korean cyber attacks. The North Korean government possesses 
relatively isolated internal networks and strongly controlled Internet connections. South 
Korea has made organizational improvements of cyber capabilities such as establishment 
of a cyber command. The North Korean government’s cyber attacks are not random, but 
are related to main political issues and tend to be linked to provocations such as military 
tests. In cyberspace, the North Korean government has used a wide range of methods, 
from simple data-stealing techniques to DDoS and sophisticated attack methods by APT. 
North Korea has increasingly attacked the private sector and has started to threaten 
critical infrastructure. 
This thesis recommends an integrated South Korean cyber defense based on a 
centralized cyber early-warning system in its network infrastructure. It further 
recommends coercing the North Korean government into negotiating a settlement with 
reversible counterattacks on Internet resources under North Korea’s control and its 
external propaganda services. Psychological operations, which can be highly effective 
against North Korea, can be linked with cyber countermeasures, yielding further positive 
effects on bargaining power. A good defense plan could enhance South Korea’s cyber 
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posture, boost the alliance between South Korea and the United States, and increase 
international cooperation in cyberspace. 
For future work, detailed technical research is needed to implement these 
recommended measures. A good strategy could be applicable to not only South Korea but 
also other countries that are in similar situations with cyber threats. Establishing a cyber 
early-warning system requires study related to big-data methods because of the enormous 
data from network traffic. Further research on cyber rules of engagement could also be 
helpful. 
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